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SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

Les problèmes de la langue à la lumière d'une théorie novelle. ALBERT SECHEHAYE. Rev. Ph., XLII, 7, pp. 1–31.

The point of departure for modern linguistics was a work by Franz Bopp, published in 1816, on the subject of the common ancestry of all Indo-European languages. He was followed by a group of romanticists who interpreted the history of language poetically. They believed that a primitive golden age when speech was pure passed into a period of decadence, which was marked by a disfigured and corrupted speech. The neogrammarians who flourished about 1875 treated language more scientifically, but their point of view was abstract; setting the 'matter' of language over against the work of the human mind, they were interested only in the automatic process by which phonetic sounds are transformed. In 1896 through a renewed interest in psychological interpretation language was connected with the human mind and will. This was an important step forward, but the specific nature of language had not yet been determined. The fundamental work in defining the meaning and relations of the science of language has been done by the scholar Ferdinand de Saussure. His theory is in a sense a correction and development of the theory of Whitney, the American student of Sanskrit, as it is expressed in his work *The Life of Language.* Saussure's doctrine can be stated in the form of seven theses or principles which constitute a logical development. The first distinguishes speech (*parole*), the individual, occasional, and particular expression of thought, from language (*langue*), the social institution, the sum of the conventions and laws imposed by a community upon speech to insure intelligibility. The second assigns language to the class of semiological institutions, or systems of signs, employed by a community; the third defines all semiology as essentially a science of values. Values are either natural or arbitrary; the signs of language are in the main arbitrary. The fourth insists that both the phonetic sounds of language and the ideas which they represent exist only as members of a closely coherent system of values, and that the relative character of signs in the system is more important than their intrinsic quality. These first four theses expound the *nature* of language; the other three deal with its *evolution.* The fifth states that because language contains much that is arbitrary and illogical, mind cannot easily modify its forms; but that, exactly because of this irrational element, it is easily affected by agencies which have nothing to do with the mechanism of language, as, for example, such an external circumstance as the war. In the sixth Saussure insists upon the distinction between two types of problems,—the synchronous, that is, those regarding organized systems and states of language, those of the traditional grammar, and the diachronous, problems concerning the changes and development of language. Finally Saussure asserts that at any given moment the state of a language is like a position in chess, it is an accidental arrangement of its elements, its elements being the arbitrary combinations of sounds and ideas. The main contribution of Saussure to linguistics is the distinction he draws between arbitrary value given to language by the blind action of the community, and rational expression, which is the ideal of the living speech of the individual, in place of the old false distinction between the physiological and psychical elements in language. He has laid a secure foundation for linguistics, but his suggestions regarding the logical elements in language have yet to be worked out.

KATHERINE E. GILBERT.

The International Idea. E. CRAWSHAY-WILLIAMS. *Int. J. E.*, XXVII, 3, pp. 273-293.

I. *Nationality and Internationality.* Roughly, there are three points of view as regards internationality: the first conceives of nations as discrete, individual entities; the second dreams of an absolute union of all nations in one; the third sees the good points in both the other views, and conceives of each nation as a numerator of nationality standing over a common denominator of internationality. Nature can be relied on to preserve all the traits of national character peculiar to a people; man can bend his efforts without caution to the task of bringing about common, universal tendencies. The indispensable method of doing this is to get men to conceive the international idea, to think more internationally. There are two agencies which, when properly managed, will accomplish this end,—travel and education. By these the young mind will be given an international bent; it will be equipped linguistically, socially, and materially to avail itself of the advantages of internationalism. II. *War and Law.* Everybody believes it is better to settle international disputes by arbitration than by war; the misgivings are all on the practical side. In reality two things only are necessary,—faith and work. Faith does not mean blind or visionary trust, but a faith that recognizes that force is the ultimate argument of humanity, the sanction of law. The real question is, however, how can force be properly applied? Now 'rowdyism' in the community of nations will pass away just as individual 'rowdyism' has within nations. For this three things are required,—laws, a tribunal, and a sanction or force. The laws and the tribunal to make them, are the least difficult; the difficulty is to insure that the laws will be obeyed. The league of peace might give us assurance but for two defects, liability to intrigue, and lack of plans. A military power must be provided for, not made up of separate quotas from different nations, each reflecting the color and prejudice of its own people, but made up of men chosen and trained in such a way that their private interests are lost in their common work. In this way the world could be ruled by law with force behind it. III. *An International Language.* In order to bring about the ideal of internationalism, there must be an international language. There are many difficulties in the way of adopting an *ad hoc* language like Esperanto, but an international council might be appointed to select one of the existing languages, and make it universal. Such a scheme could be put into operation in one generation, learned by each school child simultaneously with his native tongue, since children can learn two languages almost as easily as one. IV. *Standardization.* Overstandardization, or a dead level of similarity, would be an evil, but certain changes might be made in existing international differences with beneficial results: one standard of weights and measures might be easily universalized; the coinage of each country might be accepted in all; together with the national, international stamps might be used; and laws might be made more uniform. V. *An International Party.* One factor of importance for the international ideal is to have a great leader. "He is a matter for fate and for opportunity." But once here he must have a machine to work with, an international party. Suppose such a party were interested in the limitation of national armaments. It might ask the candidates for the various legislative bodies,—"Are you in favor of such and such a scheme for the limitation of armaments, *provided that the rest of the world agrees to the same*?" In this way it could appeal directly and forcibly to the people themselves. What would be needed for the establishment of such a party would be,—organization, men of ability, and money. These, joined to inspiration and hard work, could soon produce an international body the weight of whose opinion would be felt in all the council chambers of the world.

F. W. A. MILLER.

Bergsonism in England. J. W. SCOTT. Monist, XXVII, 2, pp. 179–204.

It is characteristic of Bergson that he attacks problems, not other people's solutions of them. There is thus a freshness about his work. What, he asks, can we make of the world as reported by the sciences? It seems apparent to Bergson that the universe was and is created by that spiritual energy which we see forcing itself forward in evolution. But how does such a view differ from that of T. H. Green? Both say that the universe is conscious and is the product of its consciousness; both that it is an active or willing, and not a conceptual, consciousness. Bergson appeals from the intellect; Green accepts it critically. They differ, however, in their doctrine of time. For Green the universe is finished, perfect; change, and therefore time, are appearance. For Bergson the world is ever new, ever changing; time is of its essence. Bergson cannot, therefore, affirm a *God*, enduring in perfection, or an *immortality* out of time. As for *freedom*, it exists for Green in the intellectual act of summoning the series of past spatial events into the present. Bergson denies space; for him there is no such series of events. The latter interpenetrate, and their interpenetration is time. By summoning ourselves together we feel this unity —we are free. Bergson's weakness here is in rejecting the intellect in his search for truth. Green trusts the instrument he is using. Yet Bergson is among the few who see the real issue regarding freedom. Freedom is not found in choice; it is the affirmation of the whole self in action. But in the space-reality which Bergson denies is found the very stuff and fiber of the moral life. For him the moral point of view is, therefore, not real.

ALLEN J. THOMAS.

Rousseau's Doctrine of the Right to Believe. NORMAN WILDE. Mind, N.S., XXVI, 101, pp. 12–29.

The vicissitudes of Rousseau's life drove him into the enjoyment of nature which had been for him since his youth a wonderful dream-world and, at the same time, reality. This identification of his dream-world with reality is the explanation of his temperamental optimism which becomes explicit in his belief in God. To appreciate emotionally God's gloriously beautiful world was, for Rousseau, to pray. He believed in a future life wherein God's justice demanded that virtue be completed by happiness. He believed in the freedom of man's immaterial soul—a freedom based on man's spontaneous intelligence and power of choice. This spontaneity of the mind is illustrated both by Rousseau's theory of knowledge and his theory of conduct. Morality is merely the self-expression of a nature fundamentally good. He believes in a conscience which is "an innate principle of justice and virtue." This seems like the moral sense philosophy of Shaftsbury. His world-view is in outline identical with that of Deism. With Rousseau it is not a case of accepting an idea, but of being possessed by it. In his founding conviction upon theory and in his emphasis upon useful knowledge Rousseau approaches pragmatism. Still he is not pragmatic. He believes in an objective truth and contends only for the right to believe where objective and conclusive evidence is lacking. At such times he trusts himself to an 'instinct of the soul.' We could trust this instinct, he believes, if only we could get back to our original simplicity of vision. He is more akin to the faith philosophers than to pragmatism; but his real place is with the Platonizing intuitionists.

ALLEN J. THOMAS.

L'idéalisme positif. DR. GRASSET. Rev. Ph., XLII, 3, pp. 245–270.

Positive Idealism treats of the relations and laws which govern phenomena, but not of substances. The positive method, however, can be applied only to phenomena which are absolutely determined, and psychic phenomena, it is said, are not absolutely determined. How, then, is a positive science of man possible? The reply is that there are different kinds of determinism. Biological determinism differs from physico-chemical determinism. Human determinism, likewise, is different from general biological determinism. Human acts are determined, but not necessarily in a physico-chemical sense or even in a general biological sense. The positive method should be both introspective and objective. Positive Idealism should deal with the functions of living man, not with the anatomy of the dead body. Anatomically, man's brain is much like that of other animals, but functionally, it is very different. There are three orders of laws: physico-chemical, biological, and human. Man is subject, of course, to physico-chemical laws and also to biological laws, which involve biological teleology. But man is also governed by special human laws. Man differs from the animals in intellectual superiority, and in the power to progress indefinitely. It is a law of humanity that each individual should aid in this progress. The reactions of man to biological laws are different from the reactions of animals. The acts of animals are necessary. In the acts of man there is a certain *contingency*, the possibility of direct intervention with the activity of the psychic neurone. As this function is composed of unknown elements, human decisions can not be foreseen. The act of man is free. Man obeys his biological laws only when he wishes to do so. Human liberty, however, is not the freedom of indifference, and the free act is not an act without a cause. As Duprat has said, liberty should be reconciled with determinism; but this determinism should be self-determinism, not determinism from without. Positive Idealism includes all that is susceptible of a positive treatment in psychology, ethics, sociology and the fundamental laws of logic. These laws are *a priori*, and indeed are the condition of experience. Yet they are established by introspection, which is a scientific method. Man is bound to his biological laws only by a moral obligation. Hence arise the ideas of responsibility and duty. These ideas can not be based upon general science. Only by considering the science of man apart from general science can we give to ethics a scientific basis. Metaphysics and religion remain outside the field of Positive Idealism. Positive Idealism does not deny the existence of metaphysics and religion. It admits the metaphysical psychic fact and the religious psychic fact, both of which it studies and utilizes. But Positive Idealism is not concerned with the origins nor with the conclusions of metaphysics and religion. Positive Idealism is positive because it is based on the scientific method; it is idealistic because it refers the object to the subject. There is an indissoluble unity of thought and action. As Fouillée has said, every state of consciousness is *idea* and also *force*. Positive Idealism has the authority and the value of a science.

MELVIN RIGG.

The Present Status of the Unconscious. GUSTAVE A. FEINGOLD. Monist, XXVII, 2, pp. 205–233.

The interests of those who write about the unconscious are various; those of one class of writers are metaphysical, those of a second, practical. A third group comprises psychologists who are seeking the 'what' and 'how' of subconscious activity. Leibniz was the first in his conception of the *petites perceptions* to formulate definitely the theory of the subconscious. Among modern writers there is a great disparity of opinion on the subject, largely due to the fact that the term subconscious is used in widely different senses. However, two general theories may be distinguished: the psychical and the physiological. Freud, Sidis, andJanet are the chief exponents of the former, declaring that the subconscious is dissociated consciousness. Pierce, Jastrow and Ribot are representatives of the latter, maintaining that the explanation of unconscious phenomena must be sought in neural processes. Freud suggests that latent perceptions should be denoted by the term unconscious. He distinguishes two kinds of latent ideas, the 'fore-conscious' and the 'unconscious' which, meeting resistance, do not penetrate consciousness, however strong they may be. Sidis gives three definitions of the subconscious, the medico-popular, the metaphyscial and the scientific, respectively. According to him the subconscious may be of three types; desultory, synthetic or recognitive. What is commonly called subconscious he would call conscious, while that which is commonly called conscious he would call the self-conscious. The subconscious self is only a power of mental life. Dual personality is explained as follows: When a sufficient number of submerged moments of consciousnesses have accumulated they tend to become synthesized, to break forth into attentive consciousness. This secondary consciousness appears as a new and independent personality. Clearly Freud and Sidis have essentially the same viewpoint, neither offering a satisfactory solution in the light of the fundamental postulate of psychology,—namely, that 'every psychosis has its neurosis.' Sidis seems completely out of harmony with this postulate in his attack on the theory of unconscious cerebration. He maintains that the subconscious must be considered not as 'an unconscious physiological automaton,' but as 'a secondary self.'—In seeking for an explanation of instances of so-called intelligent actions which are unaccompanied by consciousness perhaps a better explanation than that of unconscious consciousness can be found. The case of a person who, absorbed in a magazine, yet picks his way safely through a crowded thoroughfare may be explained by the fact that strong association bonds have been formed in the past between the visual and motor centers so that response to visual impressions is discharged through the path of least resistance without reaching the association centers. The physiological theory of the unconscious, generally stated, holds that the subconscious is purely physiological. Münsterberg, Ribot, and Jastrow subscribe to this view. According to Irving King likewise, the subconscious must be interpreted in terms of neural dispositions. The subconscious is not to be conceived as dim consciousness but, in King's words, as a physical mass of neural dispositions, tensions and actual processes which are in some degree, perhaps, organized. Morton Prince conceives the problem of the unconscious as one of memory. Memory is composed of three factors—registration, conservation and reproduction. The conception of conservation as a physical residuum is based on the assumption that whenever we have a mental experience of any sort some trace is left in the neurones of the brain. The neurones have become organized into a functioning system corresponding to the system of mental states which accompany the original experience. Hence when the original ideas are reproduced in the form of memory it is because there is a refunctioning of the physiological neural process. Hypnotism, crystal gazing, and automatic writing can all be explained on this basis. In accordance then with the psycho-physiological theory of memory we may define the unconscious as the brain residua,—the neurograms in which the experiences of life are conserved. At present there are, then, three theories of the unconscious before us; the psychometaphysical, the psychophysiological with metaphysical leanings and the psychoneurological with scientific leanings. The first view, which is held by such writers as von Hartman, Myers, Delboeuf, and which declares that the whole universe is permeated with consciousness, can obviously lead nowhere. The second, held explicitly or implicitly by Freud, Sidis, Prince, Lloyd-Morgan and Janet, maintains "that there is consciousness in all organisms, only it is not conscious of itself." The third which asserts that neurological modifications are the essential factors of conscious and unconscious phenomena is held by writers like Ribot, Pierce, Jastrow and King. There is no doubt which view will appeal to scientists as leading to a greater extension of human knowledge.

VIRGINIA BAKER.

L'idée initiale de la philosophie de Descartes. A. ESPINAS. Rev. de Mét., XXIV, 3, pp. 253–278.

Descartes's first studies, after leaving *La Flèche,* were mathematical. He seems to have been led into philosophy by reading a treatise by St. Augustine, *De Utilitate credendi.* He brought to philosophy, as a result of these early studies, a mathematical ideal. The methodic doubt which he employed was not directed primarily to political or religious matters, but rather to physics and cosmology. The school taught the physics of Aristotle, and an attack upon Aristotelian physics was an attack upon the social order. This is why his reformation of physics was a serious matter. The doctrine of the automatism of the animals was an early product of his new method. It came to him when he discovered the application of algebra to geometry and of mathematics to physics; it was a part of his doctrine of mechanism, which opposed bare extension to pure thought. The Aristotelian doctrine that animals have sensitive souls offered difficulties in connection with the doctrine of immortality. Descartes's theory was consonant with Christian spiritualism which demanded that the doctrine of divine personality and human liberty take the place of the pantheistic hylozoism of the Greeks. It simplified cosmology, on the one hand, and made the human soul, on the other hand, absolutely distinct from the body, connected with it only by a passing tie. Pascal is said by Baillet to have admired the doctrine of animal automatism more than any other part of the Cartesian system. In the *Regulae* Descartes laid down the method which was to guide him. He there remarks that only mathematical knowledge is certain; this is because of the simplicity of its objects and the order in which they can be arranged. If we could follow such a method, proceeding from the simple to the complex, and avoiding all judgment on matters not so deduced, we would avoid all error and there is no truth to which we could not attain. Since order and measure may be attributed to all things one can conceive a universal mathematics. This identification of mathematical and philosophical method rests upon a metaphysical dogma. This dogma is the doctrine of simple natures, or essences, innate truths, pure forms grasped by intuition, out of which all complex natures are constituted. The forms which objects imprint upon sense are either simple or complex, and it is possible for thought to reduce the complex forms to the simple forms. Those who hold that Descartes's doctrine of limiting our efforts to what is within our power foreshadows Kantian 'criticism' are mistaken; Descartes was objecting to magic, astrology, and alchemy. Descartes believed that he was directly dealing with the absolute when he enumerated in the *Regulae* the avenues and stages which lead to the absolute through the simple natures.

W. CURTIS SWABEY.

Principes fondamentaux pour la sociologie mécanique. A. PORTUONDO. Rev. Ph., XLII, 3, pp. 219–244.

This article is an attempt to apply the laws of mechanics to social phenomena. It is the first chapter of a book, *Apuntes de Mecánica Social*, published at Madrid. In social mechanics we regard society simply as a system of individuals and collections of individuals upon whom are exercised psychic forces. In this study we select one particular social situation which we abstract from all related situations, and treat singly. There is at a given moment in each individual an *ensemble* of ideas, feelings, and habits of willing. In every social group there is a like *ensemble*. The 'position' of an individual or of a group in a given situation at a given moment is the *ensemble*, in the individual or in the group, of all the psychic phenomena relating to the situation. The social 'position' of an individual can be symbolized by a point in space; the 'position' of a group by a system of points. When the 'position' of an individual changes, there is a certain movement in a certain direction. The movement of a group is the totality of the movements within the group. Social statics is the study of the case in which social forces balance each other and there is no change. Social dynamics is the study of the case in which a change is produced. Just as we can in mechanics theoretically predict movements if we have a knowledge of the initial state and of all the forces concerned, so in a completed social mechanics we could predict changes if we possessed a knowledge of the initial state and of the forces concerned. Mechanics is based upon the law of inertia. Every body tends to continue its present state of rest or its present state of movement uniformly in a straight line. If there is a change from this state of rest or uniform movement, we infer the existence of some external force. Let us apply this idea to social mechanics. For the sake of simplicity we shall consider an individual who is in a state of repose in regard to a certain situation. If the 'position' of this individual in this particular situation subsequently changes, we infer the existence of some psychic force acting upon the individual. The individual is the point of application of the force. With the ultimate nature of this process we are not concerned. In mechanics there is an equality of action and reaction. In such a case the masses are in an inverse ratio to the ratio of the accelerations. $m/m' = v'/v$. Likewise in social mechanics when an individual is acted upon by another individual or by a group, the first individual reacts with an equal intensity in the opposite direction. The masses of the elements concerned are in an inverse ratio to the ratio of the changes effected. In social mechanics we are not concerned with the character of the actions, but only with the directions and intensities of forces and with their points of application. Everything to which the individual pays attention is an effective psychic force. The force must be adapted to the social element effected. The intensity of the force depends largely upon the state of this social element.

MELVIN RIGG.

The Meaning of the "Universe." (I) CHARLES E. HOOPER. Mind, N.S., XXVI, 102, pp. 129–145.

There is no absurdity in seeking a definition of the universe; for the idea is commonly and confidently used. As a preliminary definition one may take "the whole reality to which our thoughts have partial access." By universe we mean a totality of real thought-objects, considered under four aspects: Space, Time, as possessing Natural Characters, and as under Natural Causation. Space and time, taken in the concrete non-mathematical sense, are real aspects of the objective world. Everything, including Kantian noumena and the Spencerian Unknowable, is a thought-object. Reality means having a place in space and time. Its opposite is mental figment, not appearance, for what is real may appear. There are, therefore, no degrees of reality, although there are degrees of truth. A more formal definition of the universe would be 'a real and self-sufficient thought-object, which contains all other real thought-objects, both self-significant and symbolic.' Our earlier definition used the idea of aspects. Different aspects in physical things are founded not only in differences of view-point, but also in differences in the object; thus a sphere of uniform surface, texture, and color would be the same from any view-point. This notion of aspect can be applied to the universe itself.

W. CURTIS SWABEY.